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As of 15 June 2020

1. To reassess the current violent extremism and terrorism threats in the Philippines;
2. To learn about good practices of the Philippines in counterterrorism; and
3. To make recommendations aimed at supporting the Philippines in strengthening its capacities to respond to the current terrorist threat.

It may be recalled that the last time CTED conducted such a visit to the Philippines was in 2014, which visit resulted in 22 recommendations. The second follow-up visit then tabled the country's milestones in relation to each of the recommendation.

B. 8th Regional Meeting of Heads Intelligence and Security Services in South-East Asia, 11 November 2020

The DFA coordinated with the National Security Council and the UN Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team (MT) regarding the Philippines' Co-Hosting of the 8th Regional Meeting of Heads Intelligence and Security Services in South-East Asia held on 11 November 2020 in Manila. Senior Representatives from the intelligence and security services of Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, China, Indonesia, Japan, the La People's Republic, Malaysia, Myanmar, New Zealand, the Philippines, Singapore, the Republic of Korea, Thailand, and Viet Nam were invited to this closed high-level meeting.

These meetings, mandated by the UN Security Council, allow for a regional counter-terrorism focused on analytical exchange that can inform the work of the Security Council to counter ISL (Da'esh), Al-Qaida and their associates. Annex I (v) of Security Council Resolution 2369 (2017), mandated the MT "to consult, in confidence, with Member States' intelligence and security services, including through regional forums, in order to facilitate the sharing of information and to strengthen implementation of the measures."

C. Scoping Visit for the Strengthening Resilience to Violent Extremism in Asia (STRIVE Asia) Project, 22 January 2020

The UNCTT Programme Team conducted a Technical Assessment Visit in Manila on 27 February to 2 March 2020, and has since developed a Roadmap for Implementation, which is currently under review by relevant Philippine agencies.

E. Joint High-Level Visit of the UN Office of Counter-Terrorism (UNOCT) and UN Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate

<p>National Intelligence Coordinating Agency (NICA)</p>	<p>Through Anti-Terrorism Council (ATC) Resolution No. 38, the NAP P/CVE was adopted. The NAP P/CVE is the comprehensive, harmonized and synchronized national strategy of the government to prevent and counter violent extremism. It includes programs that address the political, economic, cultural, psychosocial and religious factors of radicalization that lead to violent extremism.</p> <p>The NAP P/CVE is grounded on the 4 pillars of the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy that addresses the conditions conducive to terrorism, preventing and combatting terrorism, building the states capacity and ensuring human rights and the rule of law. The NAP P/CVE is also a response to UN's call to develop a Plan of Action to Prevent VE (A/70/674) and the ASEAN's Manila Declaration to counter the rise of radicalization and violent extremism. It is also aligned with the current National Security Policy and Strategy which highlight the need to address the process of radicalization and prevent recruitment through a whole-of-nation approach.</p> <p>Moreover, the DILG was designated as the lead agency for P/CVE and is responsible for the overall implementation of intervention programs under the NAP P/CVE through the sub-lead and member agencies per vulnerable sector, namely: 1) Community; 2) Persons Deprived of Liberty with Terrorism-Related Cases (PDL with TRC) in Jails and Violent Extremist Offenders (VEOs) in Prisons; 3) Religious Leaders; 4) Learning Institutions; 5) Social Media Users; and 6) OFWs and Religious Scholars.</p> <p>NICA's counterterrorism efforts are anchored on the unilateral and multilateral security measures adopted by the Philippine government to counter terrorism. It orchestrates the intelligence fusion, provides regular intelligence estimate, and heads the Special Monitoring Committee that comes up with regular threat assessments, including the recommended monthly terrorism threat level. NICA also engages local and foreign intelligence agencies on terrorism-related issues and concerns, and assists the government in implementing UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolutions, specifically 1267 and 2178, to deal with the threats posed by Al Qaeda and the Taliban and foreign terrorist fighters (FTF), respectively.</p> <p>NICA, along with the Member Agencies of the Anti-Terrorism Council (ATC), is strongly advocating for the amendment of the</p>
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CVE, anchored on the unique socio-cultural and religious setting in the Philippines. The CVE also aims to establish a program to counter radicalism through dialogue and community engagements.

Aside from all these non-

The NACS is a strategic and collective response to Money Laundering/Terrorist Financing (ML/TF) risks identified and provides for a whole of government approach in AML/CFT efforts. It enables the government and the private sector to have a coordinated and strategic approach towards combating money laundering, its related predicated offenses, terrorism and terrorism financing in the country.

The NACS focuses on seven (7) strategic objectives, to be accomplished in three (3)-tier timeframes (1-year, 3-year, and 5-year periods), namely:

Objective 1 Enhance the Philippine AML/CFT Legal Framework in Order to Effectively Address the Country's ML/TF Risks and the Deficiencies in the Country's Compliance with the International Standards

Objective 2

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FinTech/RegTech industry, financial industry, multi-lateral bodies, think tanks and academia from across the region and the globe.

This year's CTF Summit theme is Together United - Strengthening Our Region. Participants reflected on the growth and the substantial achievements of the Summit and its working groups since its establishment in 2015. This includes the evolution of the regional Financial Intelligence Consultative Group (FICG) to both improve the understanding of key regional CTF risks and strengthen operational collaboration between regional FIUs on mutually agreed transnational crime priorities.

The Summit addressed a range of key and emerging money laundering and terrorism financing issues, including child exploitation, human trafficking, wildlife smuggling, trade-based money laundering and corruption. The abuse of crowd funding, social media platforms and virtual assets were also considered.

D. Financial Intelligence Consultative Group on Counter-terrorism/Terrorist Financing

The FICG was organized during the Bali, Indonesia Summit in August 2016 and participated in b3 >>BDC g-6(oups)-2()und

3. Freeze Order.

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Terrorism and Terrorism Financing threat assessment was integrated in the Philippines' first and second National Risk Assessment (NRA) reports. Under the second NRA report, Terrorism threat in the country is rated high given the high number of violent incidents associated with terrorist/threat groups. Similarly, Terrorism Financing threat is rated high as terrorist/threat groups in the country appear to have a systematic and established method of raising funds for their operations.

the AMLC)

In line with the South East Asian Counter-Terrorism Financing Working Group (SEA CTFWG) data collection project, the AMLC, as the project manager on Self-Funding, crafted a comprehensive report on how the ISIL-aligned terrorist organizations and other high-risk groups in Australia and SEA region raise funds through self-funding. The SEA CTFWG members and guests shared information on the identified self-funding sources used by the terrorist or threat groups in the Southeast Asia aligned with ISIL; provided analyzed financial intelligence, classified, and open source information; agreed to collaborate on top-priority targets to develop disruption strategies, which may be done through analyst exchange programs; and work with law enforcement agencies or regional agencies to implement these disruption strategies.

The AMLC spearheaded an examination of ISIL-SEA's self-funding to understand it further and to put disruption strategies in place. The report identified that terrorist groups in the SEA region and Australia raised funds through self-funding through illegal activities and also by legitimate means. Self-funding by illegal activities are those raised from criminal sources, such as kidnapping for ransom, extortion from the local population, and drug trafficking or drug smuggling. Another method of self-funding for terrorism financing is through legitimate sources, such as family support, sympathizers' donations, business profits and legitimate income.

5. Foreign Terrorist Fighters (FTF) Study - a three-part study with strategic, operational intelligence, and tactical analysis components (on-going to cover 2019-2020)

The AMLC is conducting a three-phase risk assessment on foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs). The assessment aims to integrate strategic (1st phase), operational (2nd phase), and tactical (3rd phase) analysis to gain a deeper understanding of the country's risk and exposure to FTFs and cross-border terrorism linked financial activity. At a strategic level, the report aims to examine aggregated transaction activity by suspected FTFs and their supporters to inform policymakers and industry on methods and channels used for terrorism and extent of suspected TF, in terms of amount and persons/jurisdictions involved. At an operational

1. Family Support/ Business profit/Zakat

The Maute clan received its funds primarily from its family members particularly from their patriarch and matriarch. The Maute clan also served as constructors for Marawi-based infrastructure projects.

Zakat (religious donations) given through the Maute Group, as well its business ventures helped in fund-raising said group's activities.

2. Remittances from a foreign terrorist financier

In the case of Marawi City siege perpetuated by the Maute Group, intelligence community reported that 6.9 (10.5 M)

Office for Transportation
Security (OTS)

security protocols in accordance with the ICAO (Annex 17) and IMO (ISPS Code) conventions of which the country is a signatory. These protocols constitute part of the anti-terrorism policy of the country with respect to public transportation.

On the aspect of civil aviation security, OTS updated the National Civil Aviation Security Program (NCASP) last year. The NCASP prescribes preventive measures in the operations of international and domestic airports and airlines, which include periodic security audits and inspections, security risk assessments, and security coordination activities, among others, to protect civil aviation from the threat of terrorism. OTS also operates security screening checkpoints in all airports.

On maritime transportation security, OTS continues to implement the ISPS Code and is in the process of revising its National Security Program for Maritime Transportation, which prescribes preventive measures in the operations of international and domestic ports and ships, which include periodic security audits and inspections, security risk assessments, and security coordination activities, among others, to protect maritime transportation from the threat of terrorism. OTS also issues security certificates of compliance to ships and port facilities.

On land transportation security, there is no international land transportation security protocol considering that not all countries have land borders with other countries. It is assumed that the security of land travel is left to the security policies and procedures of each state. Nonetheless, as part of the government's efforts to prevent terrorists from attacking road and rail transportation facilities, OTS is implementing the National Land Transportation Security Program, which prescribes preventive measures in the operations of buses/bus terminals and trains/train stations. Likewise, this policy includes periodic security audits and inspections, security risk assessments, and security coordination activities, among others, to protect land transportation from the threat of terrorism. OTS is also capacitating the personnel of bus and train companies on secur

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The NSC-STMCOM Subcommittees and Technical Working Group are inter-agency bodies created to assist STMO in the implementation of the STMA in specific areas like Risk Assessment, Technical Reach Back, Enforcement, and Trade Facilitation. The subcommittees, through established inter-agency protocols, work closely together to increase the capacity to detect and disrupt illegal strategic goods trade, which, in most cases, is supportive of terrorist agenda.

4. Commodity Identification Training - STMO spearheads the Commodity Identification Training (CIT) program, geared towards making frontline trade and enforcement officers from the Bureau of Customs (BOC) and the Philippine Economic Zone Authority (PEZA) /fhec

The PCTC also regularly participates in inter-agency meetings such as the NALECC Sub-Committee on Anti-Money Laundering / Combating the Financing of Terrorism (SCAML/CFT).

The PCTC-INTERPOL NCB Manila Inter-Agency Coordinating Committee also regularly conducts monthly meetings along with its 46 member 'Law Enforcement Agencies' (LEAs) and Regulatory Bodies, the primary aim of which is to strengthen and enhance inter-

Project PACIFIC Working Group Meeting on the Southeast Asia Foreign Fighters	To identify Terrorists Individuals and Groups, terrorists' travel and mobility, use of social media and the Internet by terrorists, and movement of dangerous supply, and discuss terrorism financing.
Joint 'Middle East and North Africa' (MENA) And Asia-Pacific Counter-Terrorism Working Group Meeting	To address the terrorism nexus between MENA and Asia-Pacific regions and its impact on international peace and security, driven in large part by the 'Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant' (ISIL).

D. Law Enforcement Operations

The Bureau also has a real-time interconnectivity with INTERPOL's database, which has been very successful in intercepting passengers with INTERPOL notices at the arrival and departure areas of PH's international ports. These passengers are then either refused entry or off-loaded after appropriate verification of identity. INTERPOL is automatically informed of the attempted border crossing and the action taken by the Bureau.

The Bureau's ATG also word 0.007 Tw 3.163.17 Tw1e